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Truth in Evidence and the Privilege
Clause -- A Compromised Relationship
James R. McCall'
The subsection of the California Constitution known as the
"right to truth in evidence" was a small but highly significant
portion of a mosaic of anticrime measures contained in what is still
popularly referred to as Proposition 8.1 This provision ultimately
became Article I, section 28(d) of the California Constitution on
June 8, 1982, the effective date of all provisions contained in
Proposition 8.2 The announced purpose of section 28(d) was "to
restbre balance to the rules governing the use of evidence against
criminals," to "overcome some of the adverse decisions by our
higher courts," that have "created additional rights for the
criminally accused and placed more restrictions on law enforcement
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of Law, San Francisco,
California; B.A., Pomona College, 1958; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1962.
1. CAL. CONST. art 1, § 28(d). Section 28(d) provides:
(d) Right to Truth-in-Evidence. Except as provided by statute hereafter enacted by a two-
thirds vote of the membership in each house of the Legislature, relevant evidence shall
not be excluded in any criminal proceeding, including pretrial and post conviction motions
and hearings, or in any trial or hearing of a juvenile for a criminal offense, whether heard
in juvenile or adult court. Nothing in this section shall affect any existing statutory rule
of evidence relating to privilege or hearsay, or Evidence Code, sections 352, 782 or 1103.
Nothing in this section shall affect any existing statutory or constitutional right of the
press.
Id.
Other provisions in Proposition 8 which became either portions of the California Constitution
or Penal Code sections provided a right for California crime victims to obtain restitution from those
convicted of the crimes perpetrated upon them, a right to safe schools, a requirement that public
safety be the primary consideration in setting bail for persons accused of crimes, expanded
admissibility of prior felony convictions as impeachment evidence, elimination of the -diminished
capacity" defense in criminal prosecutions, automatic enhancement of sentences for convicted
defendants who are "habitual criminals," a right for a victim of a crime to appear and make a
statement at the sentencing of the perpetrator of the crime, and limits on plea bargaining for serious
offenses, including driving while intoxicated.
2. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d).
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officers," and to "restore victims' rights and help bring violent
crime under control." 3
In the measured apolitical words of the Legislative Analyst,
section 28(d) was described as having the following effect:
Under current law, certain evidence is not permitted to be presented in
a criminal trial or hearing. For example, evidence obtained through
unlawful eavesdropping or wiretapping, or through unlawful searches of
persons or property, cannot be used in court. This measure generally
would allow most relevant evidence to be presented in criminal cases,
subject to such exceptions as the Legislature may in the future enact by
a two-thirds vote. The measure could not affect federal restrictions on
the use of evidence.4
Within three years after its adoption, the California Supreme Court
accepted what is the apparent purpose of section 28(d): To ensure
that all relevant evidence be admitted in criminal prosecutions
regardless of exclusionary rules that are not approved by a
specified vote of the legislature or mandated by the federal
constitution.5 The supreme court also recognized that among the
specific aims of section 28(d) was that of preventing California
courts from creating nonstatutory rules to exclude evidence, a
practice the advocates of the provision had specifically decried.6
The restrictions in section 28(d) on the concept that all relevant
evidence is to be admitted in criminal prosecutions are few, and
appear to be precisely stated. Several of the restrictions have
generated no reported cases and would appear to be unlikely to do
so. This is true for example of the restriction, or exceptions,
permitting exclusion of relevant evidence required by a "statutory
3. Curb, Arguments in Favor of Proposition 8, in CAL. BALLOT PAMPHLE 34 (June 8,1982).
The advocates who are quoted were Mike Curb, then Lieutenant Governor of the State of California("restore balance"), George Deukmejian, the Attorney General of the State of California ("overcome
decisions'), and Paul Gann ("restore victims' rights"). ld. Gann was identified in the handbook as
"Proponent, Victim's Bill of Rights," the popular name for Proposition 8. ld.
4. Legislative Analyst of California, Analysis, in CAL. BALLOT PAMPHLErr supra note 3, at
32 (emphasis in original).
5. In reLanceW.,37 Cal. 3d873,889,694P.2d744,754,210 Cal. Rptr. 631, 641 (1985).
See infra notes 55-64 (discussing the Lance W. decision).
6. Id. at 888-89 n.9, 694 P.2d at 753-54 n.9, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 641 n.9.
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or constitutional right of the press.' 7  The provision in the
Evidence Code giving news media the right to withhold the identity
of sources and unpublished information in litigation is expressly
immune from the operation of section 28(d).' Further, Evidence
Code sections 782 and 1103, which exclude evidence of past sexual
behavior of complaining witnesses in sex crime prosecutions and
of plaintiffs in civil actions alleging sexual harassment or assault
have also generated no reported cases.9 With one minor exception,
the same is true of the express restriction for an existing statutory
rule relating to hearsay.1" Finally, the explicit restriction in favor
of statutory provisions enacted by two-thirds of each house of the
legislature was significant, yet has generated no real controversy."
7. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d).
8. See CAL. EvID. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1992) (affording news media the right to
withhold the identity of sources in litigation). As will be discussed, California courts appear to have
determined that a "privilege' for purposes of the privileges clause is a designated privilege expressly
defined in sections 930-1063 of the California Evidence Code. See infra notes 64-67 (discussing the
meaning of "'privilege"). The "newsman's immunity" provision in section 1070 is continued in
Division 8 of the Evidence Code. See CAL- EvID. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1992). That division
is titled "'Privileges," and the division contains a Chapter 4 entitled "'Particular Privileges" which
sets out all of what should logically be considered the designated privileges. Evidence Code section
1070 is not contained in Chapter 4 and arguably would not be considered a privilege for purposes
of the privileges clause in section 28(d). The point is moot, however, because section 1070 is
obviously a statutory right of the press and specifically excepted from the operation of section 28(d).
9. CAL Evm. CODE §§ 782, 1103 (West Supp. 1992). These provisions, amended in 1974,
are essentially "rape shield" statutes designed to give greater protection to complaining witnesses
who are alleged victims of sex crimes from the introduction of evidence of past sexual conduct to
impeach the credibility of the witness or to prove the alleged victim consented to sexual activity.
10. CAL CoNsT. art 1, § 28(d). See People v. May, 44 Cal. 3d 309, 319-20, 748 P.2d 307,
313, 243 Cal. Rptr. 369, 375 (1988) (discussing the hearsay exception). See infra notes 164-94 and
accompanying text (discussing the May decision).
11. InPeople v. Otto, 233 Cal. App. 3d279,290-91,277 Cal. Rptr. 596,608 (1991), the court
rejected the argument that the future legislation restriction on the operation of section 28(d) applied
to statutes passed by two-thirds of the members of each house who voted on the measure. Id. At issue
was the application of the restriction to the wiretap evidence exclusion provision in California Penal
Code section 63 1(c). The provision did not receive the vote of two-thirds of the membership of each
house and was overridden by section 28(d).
Among the sections of the Evidence Code that have been reenacted with the necessary two-
thirds vote of each house of the state legislature are section 1101 (generally prohibiting the admission
of evidence of a character trait of a person to prove the person's conduct on a specific occasion),
section 1103(a) (allowing the admission in a criminal prosecution of evidence ofa character trait of
the victim of the crime for which the defendant is being prosecuted in order to prove the victim's
conduct or to rebut such proof), section 351.1 (prohibiting the admission of the results of a polygraph
test), and Welfare & Institutions Code section 355.1 (excluding the testimony of a child's custodian
given in a dependency hearing from admission in subsequent criminal actions). See People v. Kegler,
1063
Pacific Law Journal Vol. 23
The exception in section 28(d) allowing full operation of
Evidence Code section 352 is significant and has been noted in
several cases.1 2 Section 352 authorizes trial courts to exclude
relevant evidence if the probative value of the evidence is
substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will
consume an undue amount of time or create a substantial danger of
prejudicing, confusing or misleading the jury.13 The operation of
the section 352 exception in section 28(d) has not been
controversial.14
The implicit restriction upon the operation of section 28(d) in
favor of exclusions of evidence in criminal trials when required by
the United States constitution is of great significance, but the
appellate opinions that have addressed the restriction have been
straightforward and predictable. The restriction, which is discussed
below in connection with the general reception of section 28(d) by
California courts, is required by the Supremacy Clause of United
States Constitution.
The only restriction upon the application of section 28(d) that
has generated controversial opinions is the clause stating,
"[n]othing in this section shall affect any existing statutory rule of
evidence relating to privilege." The judicial controversy
surrounding this provision is not surprising, given that privileges
are basically contradictory in nature and purpose to the basic notion
of "truth in evidence." Thus, it is initially somewhat surprising to
see that the drafters of the truth in evidence provision excepted the
197 Cal. App. 3d 72,89-90,242 Cal. Rptr. 897,908-09 (1987) (discussing the reenactment of section
351.1); See In re Katrina L., 200 Cal. App. 3d 1280, 1295, 247 Cal. Rptr. 754, 758 (1988)
(discussing the reenactment of Welfare and Institutions Code section 355.1).
12. See, e.g., People v. Harris, 47 Cal. 3d 1047, 1080-81, 767 P.2d 619, 639-40, 255 Cal.
Rptr. 352 (1989); People v. Taylor, 180 Cal. App. 3d 622, 632-33, 225 Cal. Rptr. 733, 738-39
(1986).
13. CAL. Evm. CODE § 352 (West Supp. 1992).
14. On the other hand, the relationship between section 352 and the provision in Proposition
8 maldng evidence of all prior felony convictions admissible for purposes of impeachment or
enhancement of sentence in criminal actions has been quite controversial. The California Supreme
Court interpreted that provision, which became Article I, section 28(f) of the California Constitution,
to authorize trial courts to exercise the power generally given to those courts by Evidence Code
section 352. People v. Castro, 38 Cal. 3d 301,312-13,696 P.2d 111, 116-18,211 Cal. Rptr. 719,725
(1985). Cf. Proposition 8 and the California Supreme Court: Interpretation Run Riot?, 60 So. CAL
L REV. 539, 554-69 (1987) (criticizing the Castro opinion).
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operation of stattitory privileges. 5 Judicial adjustment of the two
antithetical concepts has produced a dubious line of cases dealing
with what is undoubtedly the most sacrosanct of privileges in
Anglo-American law, the privilege against self-incrimination. The
line of cases compromising the otherwise coherent relationship
between the truth in evidence section and the privilege clause is
discussed in the concluding section of this Article, and a judicial
solution to the problem that line of cases poses is proposed. 6
I. THE PRIvELEGE CONCEPT IN CALIFORNA LAW
To the contemporary attorney, the deep mistrust and hostility
toward the privilege concept illustrated by common law authorities
always comes as a surprise. The basic common law principle was,
and currently remains, "the public has a right to every man's
evidence. ' 17 Evidentiary privileges flatly contravene this concept.
The rules prohibiting the admission of irrelevant material, hearsay
statements and incompetent testimony serve to eliminate
untrustworthy or distracting evidence from contaminating the fact
finding process. The privilege rules, on the other hand, prevent the
trier of fact from considering valuable, perhaps crucial, evidence
that is reliable and trustworthy. In respect to the negative effect
15. Perhaps the policy reasons that lead the legislature to enact each of the Evidence Code
privileges may have been persuasive to the drafters of section 28(d). However, a more practically
oriented supposition is that section 28(d) was probably drafted with some concern about offending
groups that might oppose the measure. If so, avoiding the opposition of the occupational groups
which enjoyed the benefit of evidentiary privileges would certainly have been a reasonable political
judgment.
The drafters of section 28(d) may also have been motivated by political concerns when drafting
the sex and rape shield laws exception and the exception for existing statutory or constitutional rights
of the press. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing the shield laws) and note 7 and
accompanying text (discussing the media shield law).
16. See infra notes 80-203 and accompanying text.
17. 12 PAR. HIST. ENo. 693 (1812) (speech in the House of Lords on May 25, 1742 by Lord
Chancellor Hardwicke). See McCoRMICK, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 72 at 70-72 (3d ed. 1984)
[hereinafter McCoRMICK] (discussing the quotation by Chancellor Hardwicke).
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privileges have on the fact finding process, the rules of privilege
are unique in the law of evidence."3
Jeremy Bentham decried the privilege concept as "one of the
most pernicious and most irrational notions that ever found its way
into the human mind." 19 While the privilege concept had
supporters in this country during the first half of this century,
20
the primary tone of academic commentary on the development of
privileges was highly critical.21  Nonetheless, the number of
recognized evidentiary privileges has increased and the concept
appears to have flourished during the last fifty years.
Privilege advocates explain the expansion of privileges as a
consequence of the recognition by society of two important
interests. First, society needs to foster certain relationships and
these relationships can only flourish if communications between the
persons in the relationship are kept private.22 Second, the societal
interest in the privacy of individuals requires the suppression of
certain information that could cause embarrassing or even
dangerous consequences if revealed.23 Further, the possibility that
some of the newer privileges may simply reflect the political power
18. See State v. 62.96247 Acres of Land in New Castle County, 193 A.2d 799, 806 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1963). In New Castle, Justice Lynch stated:
There are many exclusionary rules of evidence that are intended to withhold evidence which
is regarded as unreliable or regarded as prejudicial or misleading, but rules of privileged
communications have no such purpose. Such rules of privilege preclude the consideration of
competent evidence which could aid in determining the outcome of a case, and privilege in no
way can be justified as a means of promoting a fair settlement of disputes.
Id,
19. 5 J. BmENHAm, RAtiONALE OF JUDICIAL EvEDENCE 193-94 (J.S. Mill ed. London 1827).
20. See, e.g., 1 J. WIGMORE, EvIDENcE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 6, 8, 8a (1983)
(justifying privileges for confidential communications in a few relationships).
21. See, e.g., Morgan, Observationsfor a New Evidence Code, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 145, 151
(1940) (calling for the abolition of all privileges as a needed reform, with reenactment for only a few
with demonstrated public support). Professor Morgan, who served as Reporter for the drafting of the
Model Code of Evidence, sponsored by the American Law Institute. He repeated his negative view
of the modem development of privilege law on numerous occasions. See E. Morgan, Suggested
Remedy for Obstructions to Expert Testimony by Rules of Evidence, 10 U. oF CII. L. REv. 285, 288-
90 (1943); Morgan, The Jury and the Exclusionary Rules ofEvidence, 4 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 247,
249, 285 (1937).
22. McCoRuIcK, supra note 17, at 171. See generally Note, Developments in the Law of
Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1450, 1471-86 (1985) [hereinafter Developments]
(describing and examining the utilitarian justification for privileges for confidential communications).
23. MCCORMICK, supra note 17, at 172.
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in state legislatures of occupational groups seeking a more
"professional image" through a privilege protecting
communications between members of the occupation and their
clients has also been recognized as a viable explanation.24
Whatever the view of the privilege concept in academia, the
California Legislature has avidly embraced the idea that certain
communications and certain information should be shielded from
disclosure in court. Since 1965, when the legislature enacted the
Evidence Code, privileges may only be created by statute.' The
Evidence Code contains the two privileges that date from the
earliest common law development of modern trial procedure, those
protecting communications between attorney and client and
communications between spouses.26 The Code also sets forth all
of the generally accepted modern privileges, which protect
communications within certain relationships including clergyman-
penitent,27  doctor-patient,28  and psychotherapist-patient. 29  The
other commonly accepted privileges found in the Evidence Code
protect information, rather than communications, including the
identity of an informer who has given information to law
enforcement authorities,3" government or "official" information
of a confidential nature,31 trade secrets,32 and a citizen's political
vote.
33
24. See Developmentssupra note 22, at 1493-98 (discussing political influence on the creation
of privileges).
25. CAL. EVID. CODE § 911 (West 1966). To implement provisions of the state and federal
constitutions, California courts have continued to develop exclusionary rules, notwithstanding section
911. See, e.g., In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d 873, 882-84, 694 P.2d 744, 749-50, 210 Cal. Rptr. 631,
636-39 (1985) (discussing the vicarious exclusionary rules). The practical effect of some of the court
originated exclusionary rules is similar to that of an evidentiary privilege.
26. CAL. EviD. CODE §§ 950-62 (West 1966 & Supp. 1991) (attorney-client communications);
id. §§ 980-87 (West 1991) (spousal communications). The attorney-client privilege appears to date
from an English case decided in 1577, and the spousal communication privilege from an English
opinion in 1580. See Developments, supra note 22, at 1456.
27. Id. §§ 1030-1034 (West 1966).
28. Id. §§ 990-1007 (West 1966 & Supp. 1992).
29. Id. §§ 1010-27 (West 1966 & Supp. 1992).
30. Id. § 1041 (West 1966).
31. Id. § 1040 (West Supp: 1992).
32. Id. §§ 1060-1063 (West 1966 & Supp. 1991).
33. Id. § 1050 (West 1966).
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The Evidence Code also contains several privileges that are
found in few other jurisdictions. These privileges include protection
of communications between a sexual assault victim and a counselor
for such victims,34 communications between a domestic violence
victim and a counselor for such victims,35 and communications
between a patient and an educational psychologist.36 These
privileges also cover communications between patients and clinical
social workers,37 school psychologists,38 and marriage, family
and child counselors, all of whom are included within the Code
definition of "psychotherapist. ' 39
The Evidence Code also includes separate sections
incorporating the two privileges flowing from the fifth Amendment
to the United States Constitution.4" Section 930 establishes that
the federal constitutional privilege held by a defendant in a
criminal prosecution to refuse to take the stand and testify is
considered to be a privilege set out in the California Evidence
Code.41 In parallel fashion, section 940 establishes that the
privilege of any person to refuse to give either testimony or any
other statement under government compulsion that would tend to
be self incriminating is to be considered a privilege set out in the
California Evidence Code.42 Further, certain general procedural
rules apply to all privileges in the Evidence Code,43 and these
rules are fully applicable to the constitutional self incrimination
privileges as a result of sections 930 and 940.44
34. Id. §§ 1035-1036.2 (West Supp. 1992).
35. Id. §§ 1037-1037.7 (West Supp. 1992).
36. Id. § 1010.5 (West Supp. 1992).
37. Id. § 1010(c) (West Supp. 1992).
38. Id. § 1010(d) (Vest Supp. 1992).
39. Id. § 1010(e) (West Supp. 1992). See id. § 1010 (West Supp. 1992) (defining
psychotherapist).
40. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent part: "No person
... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." Id.
41. CAL EvID. CODE § 930 (West 1966).
42. Id. § 940 (West 1966).
43. See id. §§ 900-920 (West 1966 & Supp. 1992) (universal evidentiary procedural rules).
44. This incorporation may result in certain advantages for a person invoking the federal self
incrimination privilege in California courts. For example, section 913(a) prohibits any comment upon
the fact that a privilege has been claimed, and this applies to the privilege to refuse to give self
incriminating testimony under section 940. CAL EVID. CODE § 913(a) (West 1966). The rule,
1068
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Of far greater importance to the present inquiry is the fact that
both section 930 and section 940 declare that the privileges against
self incrimination found in both the federal and the California
constitutions are to be considered privileges established by the
terms of the California Evidence Code. In connection with section
940, which prohibits compelled testimony or statements that
incriminate or inculpate the speaker, the California Supreme Court
has embarked on what appears to be an erroneous line of cases
restricting the operation of the truth in evidence provision based
upon the fact that section 940 incorporates the California self
incriminating testimony privilege as a California Evidence Code
privilege.45
It is arguable that the privilege concept in California includes
any rule that excludes otherwise admissible evidence. Such rules of
exclusion are invariably based upon public policy determinations
that certain values must be furthered at the expense of the accurate
determination of facts in judicial proceedings. A number of such
provisions in the California codes provide for the exclusion from
evidence of certain information or previously given statements or
testimony. Among these statutory exclusions are provisions
requiring rejection of evidence of confidential communications
obtained through a wiretap," evidence of confidential
communications obtained by eavesdropping or recording,47
evidence of past testimony given by the custodian of a child in a
dependency hearing,48 evidence of the speed of a vehicle obtained
by the use of a "speed trap,"'49 and evidence obtained by an
therefore, is that no comment can be made upon the fact that a person has claimed the right to refuse
to give self incriminating testimony in a civil action in a California court. Id This rule contrasts with
the law developed under the federal constitutional privilege, which prohibits comment upon the
claiming of the privilege only in criminal prosecutions. See Brink's, Inc. v. New York, 717 F.2d 700,
707-10 (2nd Cir. 1983) (discussing the federal privilege against self incrimination).
45. See infra notes 107-123 (discussing cases addressing the California privilege against self
incrimination).
46. CAL. PENAL CODE § 631(c) (West Supp. 1992).
47. Id. § 632(d) (West Supp. 1992).
48. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 355.1 (West Supp. 1992).
49. CAL. VEH. CODE § 40803(a) (West Supp. 1992). "Speed trap" is defined in Vehicle Code
section 40802 to include measured highway sections designed for calculating the speed of vehicles
on highways and streets with unjustified speed limits where radar is used to measure the speed of
1069
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unconsented police examination of a depositor's bank records
without a search warrant or administrative or judicial subpoena.50
These statutory exclusionary provisions are not contained in
Chapter 4 of the California Evidence Code, which is titled
"Particular Privileges" and contains all of the legislatively
designated evidentiary privileges.51 This fact argues against
considering these exclusionary rules within the "privileges"
restriction in section 28(d). On the other hand, the privilege clause
in section 28(d) applies to "any existing statutory rule relating to
privilege." 52 These exclusions are contained in California statutes
and relate to the privilege concept in that they produce the identical
functional result as the claim of a designated privilege. As will be
examined below, California courts have taken what can be termed
a literal approach to the question of what constitutes a "privilege"
for purposes of the privilege clause in section 28(d).53 The effect
of this approach is that the various statutory exclusions are
effectively nullified by the truth in evidence provision.54
II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE
PRIVILEGE CLAUSE OF THE TRuTH IN EVIDENCE SECTION
A substantial majority of the appellate opinions interpreting
section 28(d) have been consistent with the announced and apparent
purposes of the drafters of the section. The basic thrust of the
section was to eliminate the body of California appellate court
vehicles. Id. § 40802 (West Supp. 1992). Vehicle Code section 40803(a) has been abrogated by
section 28(d). See infra notes 55-79 (discussing the effects of section 28(d)). Speed trap generated
evidence, however, will still be inadmissible in criminal prosecutions because Vehicle Code section
40805 provides that no court shall have jurisdiction to render a judgment of conviction if the court
admits evidence made inadmissible under section 40803(a). Id. § 40805 (West 1985).
50. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 7470-7476, 7489 (West 1980 & Supp. 1992).
51. See supra notes 24-39 (discussing the statutory evidentiary privileges).
52. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 28 (emphasis added).
53. See infra notes 75-79 (discussing the meaning of "privilege" for purposes of section
28(d)).
54. The "newsman's shield" provision in Evidence Code section 1070 is not contained in the
privileges chapter of the Evidence Code, which is chapter 4, and would fall outside the shelter of the
privileges clause for that reason. The issue is moot, however, because section 28(d) is expressly
inapplicable to "any existing statutory or constitutional right of the press." CAL. CoNsT. art. 1, §
28(d).
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precedents excluding otherwise admissible evidence through
interpretations of the state constitution. This policy was recognized
by the California Supreme Court in In re Lance W."5 At issue in
Lance W. was the continuing validity of the "vicarious
exclusionary rule" in California after the adoption of the truth in
evidence section.56 The rule gave standing to a defendant to object
to the introduction of evidence seized in violation of the
constitutional rights of a third person. 7 California courts had
followed the rule as a remedy for violations of the "search and
seizure" section of the California Constitution. 8 Federal courts,
on the other hand, had rejected the vicarious exclusionary rule in
interpreting the Fourth Amendment prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures.59 California constitutional
rights, however, are not dependent upon the existence of rights
under equivalent provisions of the federal constitution,' and
courts of the state had continued to apply the vicarious
exclusionary rule.
The court's opinion in Lance W. focused upon the intent of the
electorate in adopting section 28(d) and held that only the
exclusionary rules developed under the federal constitution could
be invoked in California courts. 1 As a guide to future
interpretation, the court stated:
55. 37 Cal. 3d 873, 694 P.2d 744,210 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1985). In People v. Smith, 34 Cal. 3d
251,258,667 P.2d 149, 151-52, 193 Cal. Rptr. 692,694-95 (1983), the truth in evidence section was
held applicable only to prosecutions for crimes perpetrated after the effective date of the section. Id.
For this reason, there were no significant appellate opinions addressing the truth in evidence section
prior to 1985.
56. Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d at 885, 694 P.2d at 751, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
57. Id. at 883, 694 P.2d at 750, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 636-37.
58. CAL. CONST. art. , § 13. Section 13 provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable seizures and searches may not be violated; and a warrant may not issue
except on probably cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons and things to be seized.
Ia In People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 761,290 P.2d 855, 858 (1955), an appellate court adopted
the vicarious exclusionary rule as a matter of California state law. L
59. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,910 (1984); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
338, 348 (1974) (discussing the vicarious exclusionary rule in relation to the Fourth Amendment).
60. See CAL. CoNsT. art. I, § 24. Section 24 provides: "Rights guaranteed by this Constitution
are not dependent on those guaranteed by the United States Constitution." Ia
61. Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d at 887, 694 P.2d at 752, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 639-40.
1071
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The express intent of section 28(d) is to ensure that all relevant
evidence be admitted. That purpose cannot be effectuated if the
judiciary is free to adopt exclusionary rules that are not authorized by
statute or mandated by the [federal] Constitution.62
The Lance W. court rejected arguments that the truth in evidence
section constituted an impermissible revision of the state
constitution63 and denied equal protection of the law to defendants
in criminal prosecutions. 4 A number of subsequent appellate
opinions have consistently applied the Lance W. holding,65 and in
People v. May,' the California Supreme Court reaffirmed and
broadened the application of that holding.67
The other basic question concerning the truth in evidence
section was whether, as a general matter, section 28(d) negated
those portions of the Evidence Code that excluded evidence from
admission in criminal trials. The express restrictions upon the
operation of section 28(d) preserve several Evidence Code
sections,68 but the effect of the section on such well established
exclusionary provisions as the rules prohibiting admission of
evidence of character to prove conduct was undecided.69 The first
62. Id. at 889, 694 P.2d at 754, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 641.
63. Id at 891-92, 694 P.2d at 756,210 Cal. Rptr. at 643. The California Supreme Court had
previously rejected the more plausible contention that Proposition 8, in its entirety, was a revision
of the state constitution, requiring a constitutional convention. Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236,
260-61, 651 P.2d 274, 288-98, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30, 44-45 (1982).
64. Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d at 892-93, 694 P.2d at 756-57, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 643-44.
65. See, e.g., In re Demetrius, 208 Cal. App. 3d 1245, 1246, 256 Cal. Rptr. 717,717 (1989)
(federal law governs on question of exclusion of evidence from full body search upon arrest); People
v. Epps, 182 Cal. App. 3d 1102, 1112-15,227 Cal. Rptr. 625, 630-32 (1986) (federal law applies to
exclusion question when defendant's blood sample destroyed by police); People v. Tierce, 165 Cal.
App. 3d 256, 262-63, 211 Cal. Rptr. 325, 328-29 (1985) (federal law applicable to exclusion of
evidence when issue of access to exculpatory evidence is raised).
66. 44 Cal. 3d 309, 748 P.2d 307, 243 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1988).
67. Id. at 316-18, 748 P.2d at 310-12, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 372-74. See supra notes 164-194
(discussing the May case).
68. See infra notes 7-11 (discussing the restrictions for privileges, hearsay and the trial court
authority to exclude evidence under section 352).
69. See CAL. EviD. CODE § 1101 (West Supp. 1992). Section 1101 was amended in 1986, but
did not receive the two-thirds vote necessary to qualify it for the future legislation clause in section
28(d). See 1986 Cal. Stat. ch. 1432, sec. I (amending CAL. Evm. CODE § 1101).
1072
1992 / Truth in Evidence and the Privilege Clause
appellate opinion on the matter, People v. Taylor noted that
section 28(d) had no general restriction in favor of the long
established exclusionary rules.71 Thus, the court held that an
Evidence Code prohibition against the admission of character
evidence was no longer operative after the passage of section
28(d). 72
The California Supreme Court affirmed the holding and
reasoning of Taylor three years later in People v. Harris.73 In
Harris, the court stressed the broad sweep of the language of
section 28(d) in holding that all Evidence Code restrictions on the
admission of character evidence of a party or a witness were
eliminated in criminal actions by section 28(d).74
On the major issue of interpretation of the privilege clause, the
appellate court opinions are consistent and correct. These opinions
have adopted the sound, but unarticulated premise, that for a
statutory rule of exclusion to qualify as a "privilege" for purposes
of the express privilege clause restriction, the exclusion must be a
designated privilege contained within Chapter 4 of the Evidence
Code."5 This interpretation is consistent with the language of
section 28(d) providing for admission of all relevant evidence in
criminal trials, subject to precisely drawn restrictions, a concept the
state supreme court has twice declared of great significance.7 ' The
70. 180 Cal. App. 3d 622, 225 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1986). The case involved Evidence Code
section 790, which prohibits admission of evidence proving that a witness has the character trait of
honesty, except to rebut evidence proving that the witness has the character trait of dishonesty. CAL.
Evin. CODE § 790 (West 1991).
71. Taylor, 180 Cal. App. 3d at 631-32, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 737-38.
72. Id.
73. 47 Cal. 3d 1047, 767 P.2d 619, 255 Cal. Rplr. 352 (1989).
74. Id. at 1081-82, 767 P.2d at 640-41, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 373-74. The restrictions in section
28(d) still preserve the ability of a trial court to weigh the probative force of evidence of character
against prejudicial effect, consumption of time, and jury confusion in deciding whether to admit a
specific offer of evidence of that type. CAL. EViD. CODE § 352 (West 1966). The California Supreme
Court has inexplicably recently stated that the issue of the effect of section 28(d) upon the character
evidence rules in the Evidence Code is undecided. People v. Jennings, 53 Cal. 3d 334, 373, 807 P.2d
1009, 1048, 279 Cal. Rptr. 780, 819 (1991). This statement, which overlooks the square holding of
Harris should, in all probability, be disregarded.
75. See supra note 52 and accompanying text (discussing the privilege clause restriction).
76. See supra notes 55-64 (discussing the Lance W. case) and notes 73-74 (discussing the
Harris case).
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interpretation is also consistent with the fact that the drafters of the
truth in evidence section used the technical word "hearsay" as a
parallel exclusion with "privilege," and there is no reason to
believe that a technical meaning was meant to be conveyed by only
one of the two words.
Pursuant to this interpretation, appellate courts have held that
the following statutory exclusionary rules, both outside Chapter 4
of the Evidence Code, were abrogated by section 28(d) and not
preserved by the privilege clause: Government Code section 7489,
which provides that evidence of bank account records seized
without proper notification under the financial privacy act is
inadmissible, 77 and Penal Code section 631(c), which excludes
evidence produced by a wiretap.73 Where exclusion has been
requested on a nonstatutory basis, courts have predictably held that
exclusion was improper given the express language of section
28(d).7
9
III. EXCLUSION OF SELF INCR MINATING STATEMENTS
IN CONCURRENT PROCEEDINGS SITUATIONS
The only area of difficulty in the interpretation of the privilege
clause has been in situations involving allegedly compelled self
incriminatory testimony in "concurrent proceedings." In this
regard, the California Supreme Court has rendered what appears to
be a clearly incorrect decision that continues to avoid being
overruled."0 The opinion is based upon a reading of the privilege
clause which thwarts the intent and purpose of the truth in evidence
77. People v. Meyer, 183 Cal. App. 3d 1150, 1162-63, 228 Cal. Rptr. 635, 641-42 (1986).
78. People v. Otto, 233 Cal. App. 3d 279,290-91,277 Cal. Rptr. 596, 608 (1991); People v.
Rateldn, 212 Cal. App. 3d 1165, 1169, 261 Cal. Rptr. 143, 145-46 (1989).
79. See, e.g., People v. Wood, 207 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 11, 16-17, 255 Cal. Rptr. 537,540-41
(1989) (holding that a Department of Motor Vehicles regulation requirement could not be enforced
by a court devised exclusionary rule); In re Garinger, 188 Cal. App. 3d 1149,1154-55,233 Cal. Rptr.
853, 855-56 (1987) (police failed to give warnings required by statute before administering a breath
test, but trial court could not exclude evidence as a means of enforcing the terms of the statute
requiring the warnings).
80. See infra notes 140-163 (discussing the case of Ramona 1. v. Superior Ct., 37 Cal. 3d
802, 693 P.2d 789, 210 Cal. Rptr. 204 (1985)).
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section and, although unnoticed before, is contrary to the language
of the section.
Concurrent proceedings occur when a defendant's alleged
conduct supplies the basis for both a criminal prosecution and a
second type of hearing, in which the person may suffer a state
imposed penalty.8 ' If the hearing is held prior to the criminal trial,
a potential self incrimination privilege problem exists. On the other
hand, if the criminal prosecution has ended before the hearing
begins, no self incrimination is possible because the privilege only
protects a witness a against criminal sentence, or penalty, resulting
from a formal criminal proceeding or prosecution. 2
The most frequently litigated concurrent proceedings scenario
involves a probation revocation hearing held to determine if a
probationer's conduct violates a condition of probation, followed
by a later criminal trial in which the state alleges that the same
conduct also violates a penal statute. Other reported concurrent
proceedings cases involve hearings to determine parole revocation,
prison discipline, dependency or right to act as the custodian of a
child,. and the fitness of an older juvenile to be tried in a juvenile
court. In each case, the hearing is followed by a criminal
prosecution based upon the same facts as those alleged by the state
in the hearing.
It is obvious that the defendant in a probation revocation
hearing would like to give testimony to support his or her position
that probation should not be revoked. This testimony may well
involve statements that would make it easier for the state to prove
81. A private civil action against a defendant in which the plaintiff alleges that the defendant
engaged in the same conduct for which the defendant is being prosecuted in a criminal action is not
a concurrent proceedings under this definition. In the civil and criminal action situations, there has
never been a controversy over the self incrimination privilege issue discussed in this article. This is
because self incrimination is only possible when a witness' testimony may be used by the state
against the witness in a criminal proceeding, meaning a proceeding leading to a criminal penalty. See
Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1985). The criminal proceeding can be the proceeding in which the
witness is testifying, in which case the witness will also be the defendanL The criminal proceeding
can also be a prosecution coming to trial after the witness's testimony in another proceeding has been
completed. Therefore if the only disadvantage a witness may incur from testifying is a civil
judgement, the self incrimination privilege is not implicated.
82. See supra note 42 (discussing the self incrimination privilege requirement of a criminal
penalty).
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its case in the later criminal trial, and the state would seek to use
those statements for that purpose. The basic self incrimination
problem raised in concurrent proceedings is whether testimony
given by the defendant in the hearing may be used against him or
her in the later criminal prosecution to prove the state's case.83
Under the now well established legal analysis used in Self
Incrimination Clause questions, the more specific issue is whether
the state is "compelling" the defendant to testify in the hearing.
"Compulsion" is obviously found present in situations in which a
witness is testifying under oath in open court and the judge literally
orders the witness to answer a question on pain of contempt.84 A
more subtle test, however, has occasionally been used to determine
if the witness was compelled to give self incriminating testimony.
That test examines the full testimonial situation to determine if the
claim or assertion for the privilege not to give further testimony is
"burdened" due to adverse effects the witness will suffer if he or
she claims the privilege.8 5 If a claim of privilege entails severely
adverse consequences, then the witness has, in the eyes of the law,
been denied the constitutional right to claim the privilege and
refuse to give testimony. The clearest example of an adverse
consequence that burdens a claim of the privilege to the extent that
resulting testimony would be considered compelled is the threat of
loss of the witness' government job if the witness claims the
privilege.8 6
83. Whether the state may impeach the defendant who testifies at trial with the defendant's
hearing testimony is a separate issue. The position of the federal courts on this issue is that the state
may use any previous voluntary statement to impeach the defendant's testimony at trial by showing
the previous statement contradicts the later trial testimony. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222,
223-25 (1971) (discussing impeachment of the defendant with prior voluntary statements made
without Miranda warnings).
84. See, e.g., New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 459 (1979) (stating that court order to
witness to answer is the "most pristine form of compulsion").
85. See, e.g., Spevackv. Klein, 385 U.S. 511,515-16 (1967) (holding that threat of disbarment
of lawyer is compulsion).
86. See, e.g., Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 276-78 (1968) (dismissal of police officer);
Slochower v. Board of Higher Education, 350 U.S. 551, 558-59 (1961) (dismissal of teacher). See
also Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 804-08 (1977) (party official barred from holding
office).
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In the concurrent proceedings context, the key question for self
incrimination privilege analysis is whether a claim of privilege by
the defendant at the hearing would be so burdened that the
defendant has no choice but to testify. If the testimony is not truly
voluntary, any testimony the defendant gives at the hearing is
considered compelled under Self Incrimination Clause analysis and
cannot be used by the state to make the state's case at the later
criminal trial.8 7 The rule of exclusion of the defendant's hearing
testimony if the privilege was overly burdened and the testimony
therefore compelled has been described by some courts as an
automatic "use immunity" that arises by operation of law to
protect the defendant from any use of his or her hearing testimony
by the state to prove its case against the defendant in the later
criminal trial.8
The right to refuse to give self incriminating testimony secured
by the Fifth Amendment was first held binding upon state
governments in 1964 in Malloy v. Hogan.89 It was (and continues
to be) taken for granted that when a witness voluntarily gives
testimony at a trial, that person is not being compelled.' ° The
voluntary testimony of the witness may then be used against that
87. It is helpful to think of the analogous issue of the admissibility in a criminal prosecution
of a prior compelled out of court statement by the defendant. Statements made while the defendant
is in custody are considered "compelled" as a matter of law under the Miranda decision in which
the Supreme Court held that unless a defendant in custody volunteers a statement after full
explanation of his or her rights, the statement is inadmissible. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
476-79 (1966). Similarly, if the burden or penalty placed upon the defendant witness if he or she
claims the self incrimination privileged at the prior hearing is too severe, the defendant's choice to
testify is, as a matter of law, "compelled" not voluntary. Id.
88. The term "use immunity" was used by the court in Ramona 1. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.
3d 802, 809,693 P.2d 789, 793-94,210 Cal. Rptr. 204,208-09 (1985). See infra notes 140-163 and
accompanying text (discussing the Ramona R case) and note 156 (discussing the use immunity
concept).
89. 378 U.S. 1 (1964). The late date at which the federal right to refuse self incriminating
testimony was held applicable to the states comes as a surprise to many. Perhaps even more
surprising is the fact that it was not until 1924 this right was fully held applicable to noncriminal
proceedings in federal courts. McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34,40 (1924). The Self Incrimination
Clause was always accepted as securing the right of a person accused of a crime to refuse to take the
stand and give testimony under oath at his or her trial. The privilege to refuse to give self
incriminating testimony, by contrast, is held by all witnesses in all proceedings. See McComilcK,
supra note 17, at 283 (comparing the Self Incrimination Clause and the privilege against self
incrimination).
90. See generally McCORMIcK, supra note 17, at 322, 345 (discussing compulsion).
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witness in a later proceeding. If the witness is a party to the action
in which he or she is testifying, the testimony may be used against
the witness in the very action in which the testimony is given.
The United States Supreme Court surprised many observers by
introducing a new consideration to the concurrent proceedings issue
in United States v. Simmons.9' In Simmons, the Court considered
the issue of whether the prosecution could use a defendant's self-
incriminating testimony at a pretrial suppression of evidence
hearing in proving its case in a later criminal trial based upon the
same facts.' A majority of the court reasoned that allowing the
prosecution to offer the testimony in evidence at the subsequent
criminal trial would mean that the defendant's assertion of his
Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches and
seizures through his own testimony would result in his losing his
right to refuse to give self incriminating testimony. 9 The majority
of the Court believed it was "intolerable that one constitutional
right should have to be surrendered in order to assert another." 94
To the Court, requiring a defendant to forego one constitutional
right to obtain the benefit of another amounted to "compulsion"
by the state.95 Accordingly the Court held that the prosecution
was prohibited under the Fifth Amendment from offering a
defendant's suppression hearing testimony into evidence at the
subsequent criminal trial.96 In a spirited dissent, Justice Black
noted that the majority's position made new law, arguing that the
defendant had testified voluntarily at the suppression hearing and
should be held to have waived the self incrimination privilege.97
Four years later the Court indicated a desire to severely limit,
if not overrule, the Simmons holding in McGautha v. California.9'
91. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
92. Id. at 393.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 394.
95. Id.
96. Id. The Court stated: [W]hen a defendant testifies in support of a motion to suppress
evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds, his testimony may not thereafter be admitted against him
at trial on the issue of guilt unless he makes no objection." Id.
97. Id. at 395-99 (Black, I., dissenting).
98. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
1078
1992 / Truth in Evidence and the Privilege Clause
The specific holding of McGautha was that there was no Self
Incrimination Clause compulsion forcing a defendant to testify in
a "unitary" trial procedure in which the jury considered the guilt
or innocence and the nature of the punishment at the same time. 9
The defendant was thereby required to either remain silent or give
his testimony to show mitigation or other grounds to avoid the
death penalty and probably thereby incriminate himself on the issue
of guilt. 10
The procedure at issue in McGautha would appear to compel
the defendant to testify to a much greater extent than the
suppression hearing procedure involved in Simmons. The Court,
however, saw the choice the defendant was forced to make as not
that much different than the choice to testify or remain silent that
any defendant in a criminal prosecution must face. 1 Thus the
Court held that there was no improper burden upon claiming the
privilege and no Self Incrimination Clause compulsion. 2 More
generally, the Court undercut expansion of the Simmons rationale
by stating:
Although a defendant may have a right, even of constitutional
dimensions, to follow whichever course he chooses, the Constitution
does not by that token always forbid requiring him to choose.
10 3
The Court stressed that Simmons was justified only because the
case involved Fourth Amendment rights, which are particularly
valuable to society as a "sanction for unlawful police
conduct."' 4  The McGautha Court stated that the Fifth
Amendment interests involved in the Simmons case were
insubstantial and that the validity of the reasoning in Simmons
based upon anything other than protection of a defendant's rights
99. Id. at 210-13.
100. Id.
101. li at 214-15.
102. Id. at 213-17.
103. Id. at 213-217.
104. Id. at 211-12.
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under the Fourth Amendment was "open to question.' '" 5 In view
of such disavowals, commentators maintain that Simmons is of little
significance as a precedent for interpretation of the Fifth
Amendment Self Incrimination Clause.1°6
The California Supreme Court demonstrated complete
appreciation for the clear intimations of McGautha in People v.
Coleman,0 7 the first case in which the court considered the
problem of self incrimination in concurrent proceedings. The
defendant-probationer in Coleman had refused to testify at his
probation revocation hearing, claiming that he feared that his
revocation hearing testimony would tend to incriminate him on the
pending criminal charges based upon the same facts."0 ' The
defendant's probation was revoked and he appealed the revocation,
claiming that he had been denied the meaningful right to be heard
at the proceeding because of the potential future use of his
testimony.1" The supreme court reversed the probation revocation
order, specifically relying upon its inherent supervisory powers
over California courts as the basis for its decision."0
The Coleman court reasoned that two policies "underlying the
privilege against self incrimination" would be "adversely
affected" if the prosecution could use a defendant's probation
revocation hearing testimony to prove its case against the defendant
at a subsequent criminal trial."' Those two policies are requiring
105. Id. at 212.
106. See, e.g., McCoRMICK, supra note 17, at 319.
107. 13 Cal. 3d 867, 533 P.2d 1024, 120 Cal. Rplr. 384 (1975).
108. Id. at 872, 533 P.2d at 1030, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 390. The basis for both the revocation
hearing and the subsequent criminal trial was an alleged property theft carried out by the defendant
and his common law wife. Id. The supreme court generally noted that a probationer might well have
given testimony at the revocation hearing that would show mitigating circumstances to explain his
conduct, but which might include "damaging factual admissions" concerning his participation in the
crime. Id. at 874, 533 P.2d at 1031, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 391. The court's statement may be true. It is
not, however, readily apparent. If truly mitigating circumstances are established by the defendant's
revocation hearing testimony, the more probable assumption would be that this testimony would be
helpful to the defendant at the subsequent criminal trial.
109. Coleman, 13 Cal. 3d at 871, 533 P.2d at 1029, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 389. The defendant's
right to a meaningful opportunity to be heard in the hearing was established by the Supreme Court
of the United States in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,.489 (1972).
110. Coleman, 13 Cal. 3d at 872, 533 P.2d at 1030, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
111. Id. at 875, 533 P.2d at 1032, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 392.
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the state to shoulder the "entire load" of proving its case in a
criminal trial and the "historic aversion to cruelty" reflected in the
self incrimination privilege." 2 The court felt that any lessening
of the state's burden by allowing it to use the hearing testimony
would affront the first policy."' The second policy was thought
to be infringed upon by requiring a probationer to choose between
giving testimony that might be used by the prosecution to make its
case in the subsequent criminal trial, committing perjury in the
hearing, or remaining silent and thereby losing the opportunity to
testify regarding mitigating circumstances and running the further
risk that "his silence will be taken as an indication that there are
no reasons probation should not be revoked. 1 1
4
The Coleman opinion fully discusses both Simmons and
McGautha, concluding with the realization that the latter opinion
eliminates Simmons as a constitutional precedent for applying the
self incrimination privilege in concurrent proceedings
situations." 5 The court read an implication in the McGautha
opinion that Simmons "should have been decided on the basis of
the court's supervisory powers over federal trials rather than the
mandates of the Constitution."11 6 The California Supreme Court
then rejected the notion of basing its opinion on any type of
constitutional standard as inappropriate because of the complexity
and variation of concurrent proceedings situations. The court then
concluded that "clothing our adjudication of the issues before us
in constitutional raiment would be not only unwise but also
unnecessary. -), 11
7
Noting its supervisory power over the state's trial courts,"'
the court held that evidence derived from a probationer at a
112. Id. at 875-78, 533 P.2d at 1032-34, 120 Cal. Rpm at 392.
113. Id. at 876-77, 533 P.2d at 1032-33, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 392-93.
114. Id. at 878, 533 P.2d at 1034, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 394.
115. Id. at 878-82, 533 P.2d at 1034-37, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 394-97. Simmons remains good law
regarding a defendant's testimony at an evidence suppression hearing when the defendant's claim is
that the evidence in question was obtained by the police through an illegal search and seizure. See
supra notes 91-97 (discussing the Simmons decision).
116. Coleman, 13 Cal. 3dat881,887n.18,533 P.2d at 1037 n.18,120 Cal. Rptr. at397n.18.
117. Id. at 886, 533 P.2d at 1040, 533 Cal. Rptr. at 400.
118. Id. at 888-89, 533 P.2d at 1041-42, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 401-02.
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probation revocation hearing could not, upon objection by the
defendant, be introduced in evidence to prove the state's case in a
subsequent criminal trial on the same basis.119 This rule was
expressly "declare[d] as a judicial rule of evidence," for the
reasons mentioned above.12 The opinion also stressed that the
concurrent proceedings self incrimination problem could be avoided
entirely by the prosecution by initiating the probation revocation
proceedings after completion of the criminal trial and
recommended that prosecutors and probation officials follow this
procedure whenever possible."'
The Coleman holding was followed in two appellate opinions
in the early 1980's dealing with the use of probation revocation
hearing testimony in later criminal trials.1" In both of these
cases, the concurrent proceedings were based upon facts occurring
prior to the effective date of section 28(d). A second line of
California cases had developed during the 1970's considering the
admissibility in a later criminal prosecution of statements a juvenile
had made to his or her juvenile probation officer. These opinions,
relying solely upon the general supervisory power of the supreme
court over state trial courts and the strong policy favoring candor
119. Id. at 889, 533 P.2d at 1041-42, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 401-02.
120. Id. at 889, 533 P.2d at 1042, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 402. The nonconstitutional basis for the
ruling was further reflected by the court's holdings that the rule was only prospective in operation,
that probation revocation hearing testimony could be used to impeach the probationer defendant's
testimony at the subsequent criminal trial, and the rule had no general application and was narrowly
applicable only to formal, dispositive probation revocation hearings. Id. at 897,892,894-95,533 P.2d
at 1047, 1044, 1045-46, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 407, 404, 404-06.
121. Id. at 896-97,533 P.2d at 1046-47, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 406-07. This solution to the problem
has been recommended in virtually all subsequent concurrent proceedings opinions. See, e.g., People
v. Jasper, 33 Cal. 3d 931, 933-35, 663 P.2d 206, 207-09, 191 Cal. Rptr. 648, 649-51 (1983); People
v. Johnson, 159 Cal. App. 3d 163, 167,205 Cal. Rptr. 427,431-32 (1984). However, such scheduling
is not always possible. See infra notes 144-149 (describing the concurrent hearing involved in
Ramona A? v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 802, 693 P.2d 789, 210 Cal. Rptr. 204 (1985)).
122. See People v. Johnson, 159 Cal. App. 3d 163, 167, 205 Cal. Rptr. 427, 429 (1984)
(following the Coleman opinion); People v. Jasper, 33 Cal. 3d 931, 933-35, 663 P.2d 206, 207-09,
191 Cal. Rptr. 648, 649-51 (1983). See also Sheila 0. v. Superior Ct., 125 Cal. App, 3d 812, 815-
817, 178 Cal. Rptr. 418, 420 (1981) (relying upon Coleman to hold that a juvenile's testimony in a
juvenile court fitness hearing was inadmissible at a later criminal prosecution based upon the same
facts).
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in communications from juveniles to probation officers, held that
the statements were inadmissible. 
123
During the ten year period following McGautha, lower federal
courts and the courts of other states took a different position from
California courts on the concurrent proceedings question.124 This
was largely due to the opinion of the United States Supreme Court
in Baxter v. Palmagiano.' In Baxter, the Court held that an
inmate had not been compelled to testify in a prison discipline
hearing because his claim of the privilege was not severely
burdened.126 At the start of the hearing, the inmate had been
informed that if he refused to testify, "his silence would be held
against him," and he was informed that any later criminal
prosecution based upon the same facts that formed the basis for the
hearing was a realistic possibility.' 27
In 1984, the United States Supreme Court held in Murphy v.
Minnesota121 that a probationer's admission of a past murder to
a probation officer was admissible in evidence when offered by the
state in a prosecution of the probationer for the murder. 129 The
probationer was under a court order to meet with the probation
officer and answer the officer's questions truthfully as a condition
123. See, e.g., In re Wayne H., 24 Cal. 3d 595,599-600,596 P.2d 1, 3-4, 156 Cal. Rptr. 344,
346-47 (1979) (holding a juvenile's admissions to a juvenile probation officer are inadmissible at a
subsequent criminal trial); Bryan v. Superior Ct., 7 Cal. 3d 575,587,498 P.2d 1079, 1087, 102 Cal.
Rptr. 831, 839 (1972) (holding that admissions by a juvenile to a juvenile probation officer or
juvenile court judge should be excluded from a later concurrent proceeding criminal prosecution).
124. See, e.g., United States v. Bazzano, 712 F.2d 826, 836 (3rd Cir. 1983); Ryan v. State of
Montana, 580 F.2d 988, 991 (9th Cir. 1978), cerL denied, 440 U.S. 977 (1979); United States v.
Brugger, 549 F.2d 2,4-5 (7th Cir. 1977), cert denied, 431 U.S. 919 (1979) (federal cases addressing
the concurrent proceeding issue). See also State v. Robinson, 556 A.2d 342, 344 (NJ. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1989); State v. Wahlert, 379 N.W.2d 10 (Iowa 1985); Evans v. State, 153 Ga. App. 764,
764, 266 S.E.2d 545, 548 (1980); Roberts v. State, 584 S.W.2d 242 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979); State v.
Cyganowski, 21 Wash. App. 119, 584 P.2d 426, 427 (1978); People v. Woodall, 44 M11. App. 3d
1003, 1009-10,358 N.E.2d 1267, 1272 (1976); State v. Randall, 27 Or. App. 869, 872-76,557 P.2d
1386, 1388-90 (1976) (state cases addressing the concurrent proceeding issue).
125. 425 U.S. 308 (1976). See McCoRxwucK, supra note 17, at 294 (stating: '[t]he previous
trend towards prohibiting burdens upon an exercise of the privilege was ended in 1976 with Baxter
v. Palmagiano.").
126. Baxter, 425 U.S. at 316-20.
127. Id. at 312.
128. 465 U.S. 420 (1984).
129. Id. at 429-30.
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of his probation. 3 While probation might be revoked on the
basis of the probationer's answers, the probationer was free to
claim the privilege against self incrimination and this claim would
not, in itself, lead to a revocation of probation."' The Court held
that this situation did not "burden" a claim of the privilege and
the self incriminating statements that the probationer gave were not
"compelled.' ' 32 Thus, the statements could be used in the later
prosecution against the probationer.
133
The Murphy opinion made plain the concept that even if
adverse consequences of some type might be incurred by the
person who claims the self incrimination privilege, a statement does
not, by itself, amount to compulsion.' As stated in Murphy, the
privilege against self incrimination is not "self executing," and
unless a burden greater than a mere potential disadvantage in a
proceeding would be suffered by a person who claimed the
privilege, the person will be considered to have given the testimony
or statement voluntarily.'35
To provide certainty to the area, the Murphy opinion explained
that "compulsion" is present in only two situations: When the
person giving the statement is in custody;3 6 and when a witness
is subject to a state imposed penalty merely for claiming the
privilege and refusing to answer.3 7  The fact that these two
130. Id. at 422.
131. Id at 433.
132. Id. at 433-34.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 428.
135. Id. at 427-29.
136. Id. at 429-34.
137. Id. at 434-39. The usual form of compulsion of this type is the contempt sanction used
to punish a recalcitrant defendant who does not give ordered testimony or statements. An example
of this type of compulsion that has been the subject of both federal and California cases is a court
order to a defendant to give statements to a psychiatrist so that the defendant's competency or sanity
can be determined by the psychiatrist. In such situations, both federal and California courts have held
that the Self Incrimination Clause prohibits use of the defendant's statements in any way at trial on
the issue of the defendant's guilt. See, e.g., Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 456-57 (1981); People
v. Arcega, 32 Cal. 3d 504, 520-23, 651 P.2d 338, 345-48, 186 Cal. Rptr. 94, 101-04 (1982);
Torantino v. Superior Ct., 48 Cal. App. 3d 465, 469-70, 122 Cal. Rptr. 61, 62-63 (1975).
The Court also mentioned a third situation, not relevant to the concurrent proceedings situation.
The situation is one in which the state requires that taxpayers state any amount of gambling income
or other guilt establishing information on income tax returns. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 439-40.
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categories are listed as exclusive completely negates the general
concept announced in Simmons that a defendant should not be
compelled to choose between self incrimination and giving
testifying to establish a privilege or right.13
With the adoption of section 28(d), judicially established rules
of exclusion such as those announced in Coleman and the juvenile
court hearing cases were clearly 'in jeopardy. Further, the
announced views of the United States Supreme Court, other federal
courts and a number of state courts indicated that the policy basis
underlying the Coleman exclusionary rule was less than convincing
to other jurists. 139 However, in Ramona 1. v. Superior Ct.,140
the California Supreme Court, nonetheless, held that the concurrent
proceedings exclusionary rule would continue to apply in California
regardless of the truth in evidence section. 41 In Ramona R., the
court held that the state could not introduce the prior testimony a
juvenile defendant had given in a juvenile court "fitness hearing"
in a later criminal trial on the same basis. 142
Defendant Ramona R. was 17 when she was charged with
murdering her guardian.1 43 At the fitness hearing she refused to
138. See supra notes 91-97 and accompanying text (discussing the Simmons decision).
139. See supra note 123 and accompanying text (discussing cases holding contrary to the
Coleman decision).
140. 37 Cal. 3d 802, 693 P.2d 789, 210 Cal. Rptr. 204 (1985).
141. Id at 804, 693 P.2d at 790, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 205.
142. Id. at 805-6, 693 P.2d at 790-92, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 5-7. Fitness hearings are held to
determine whether a juvenile between the ages of 16 and 18 will benefit from juvenile court
treatment, meaning that the juvenile is "'amenable to the care, treatment, and training program
available through the facilities of the juvenile court." CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707(a) (West
1991). If the juvenile is "fit" for the juvenile court treatment, that court retains jurisdiction of the
criminal offense and the juvenile is tried for the charged criminal offense in that court. If the juvenile
court determines that the juvenile is not fit for treatment as a juvenile, the case is transferred to the
superior court. Criteria considered by the juvenile court in a fitness hearing include: The juveniles's
degree of criminal sophistication, the juveniles's prospects for rehabilitation through the juvenile
court's programs, the juvenile's previous delinquent history and past attempts at juvenile court
rehabilitation, and the nature of the offense allegedly committed by the juvenile. Id.
The hearing determines whether an older juvenile will be tried on a criminal charge in the
juvenile court, or tried as an adult in a superior court prosecution in which a more serious sentence
may be imposed. If the crime with which the juvenile is charged is one of the serious felonies listed
in Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(b), the juvenile is presumed to be unfit for juvenile
court treatment and must meet the burden of proving that he or she is fit in order to avoid being tried
as an adult in superior court. CAL WELT. & INsT. CODE § 707(c) (West 1991).
143. Ramona R, 37 Cal. 3d at 805, 693 P.2d at 791, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 206.
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give testimony in her own behalf on the ground that any
incriminating portions of the testimony could be introduced against
her to prove the state's case at the later criminal trial on the
matter." The juvenile probation officer's report found Ramona
unfit for juvenile court treatment.1 4 The juvenile court referee
agreed and ordered that the defendant be tried as an adult on the
charge of murder in the superior court. 146 Ramona sought a writ
to vacate the order.' 47
The California Supreme Court acknowledged that the existing
judicially developed exclusionary rules based upon the court's
supervisory power, such as the rules in Coleman and the juvenile
court cases, were no longer valid after the adoption of section
28(d).1 4' The court, however, held that the exclusionary rule for
a defendant's juvenile court fitness hearing testimony would
continue to apply in California because it should be considered part
of the California statutory privilege against self incriminating
testimony under Evidence Code section 940. 149
The Ramona R. court declared that the federal law was in a
state of "confusion,""15 and that the right to exclude or the right
144. Id. The defendant also refused to discuss the alleged murder with her probation officer on
the ground that these statements might be used by the state to prove its case in a later prosecution.
Id. It was such statements to a probation officer that were held constitutionally admissible in the
Murphy decision by the United States Supreme Court. See supra notes 128-138 (discussing the
Murphy decision).
Ramona's refusal to talk to her probation officer does not present a separate self incrimination
issue. This is because all courts, including the California Supreme Court in Ramona R, have viewed
statements to probation officers as being identical to testimony at hearings for the purpose of Self
Incrimination Clause analysis. See Ramona R., 37 Cal. 3d at 807, 693 P.2d at 792-93, 210 Cal. Rptr.
at 207-08.
145. Id. at 805-06, 693 P.2d at 791, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 206.
146. Id. at 806, 693 P.2d at 791, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 206.
147. Id. at 804, 693 P.2d at 790, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 205.
148. Id. at 807-08, 693 P.2d at 793, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 208.
149. Id. at 808-10. 693 P.2d at 793-95, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 208-10. Section 940 provides: "To
the extent that such privilege exists under the Constitution of the United States or the State of
California, a person has a privilege to refuse to disclose any matter that may tend to incriminate
him." CAt. EVID. CODE § 940 (West 1991).
In Ramona R., the court held that a juvenile's statements to a probation officer in connection
with the preparation of a fitness hearing report could not be used against the juvenile in a subsequent
criminal trial. Ramona P., 37 Cal. 3d at 810, 693 P.2d at 795, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 210.
150. Id at 808-09, 693 P.2d at 793-94,210 Cal. Rptr. at 208-09. Actually, the federal law was
quite clear. See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text (discussing the relevant federal law).
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of privilege could not be based upon the United States
Constitution. 51 On this point, it is striking that the opinion
contains no mention of the Murphy opinion by the United States
Supreme Court less than one year before which removed any
"confusion" from the issue in holding that there is no privilege
under the federal constitution in concurrent proceedings
situations.
152
To qualify as a section 940 privilege, the court had to adopt the
Coleman rule of exclusion as a judicial interpretation of the self
incrimination provision of the California Constitution.'53 The bulk
of the Ramona R opinion is devoted to this task, and the court
asserts that the exclusionary rule qualifies under the privilege
clause of the truth in evidence section.
54
To accomplish this result, the court notes the discussion in
Coleman addressing the policies served by the Self Incrimination
Clause that are impinged by allowing use of hearing testimony at
the subsequent criminal trial.5 5  This is preceded by a passage
stating the court's conclusion that although Coleman was expressly
decided on a nonconstitutional basis "Coleman clearly
151. Ramona R., 37 Cal. 3d at 808-09, 693 P.2d at 793, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 208.
152. Murphy v. Minnesota, 465 U.S. 420, 427-29 (1984). The opinion in Ramona R. cites
Melson v. Sard, 402 F.2d 653, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1968) as a decision holding that the privilege exists,
and Ryan v. State of Montana, 580 F.2d 988, 991 (9th Cir. 1978) as a decision holding that no
privilege exists. Ramona R, 37 Cal. 3d at 808-09, 693 P.2d at 793, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 208. To be
charitable, the discussion is remarkably incomplete. The Melson opinion was based upon the Simmons
opinion of the United States Supreme Court, but was handed down before McGautha and Baxter v.
Palmagiano. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of the McGautha
decision on the precedential value of Simmons) and notes 125-126 (discussing the conclusive effect
of the Baxter v. Palmagiano decision). Melsen has never been held persuasive on the self
incrimination privilege by any court, with the sole exception of the Ramona . opinion. See, e.g.,
McCracken v. Corey, 612 P.2d 990,996 (Alaska 1980) and People v. Rocha, 272 N.W.2d 699, 703
(Mich. Ct. App. 1979). On the other hand, the Ryan decision was one of many federal and state court
opinions holding that no self incrimination privilege exists in concurrent proceedings situations. See
supra note 124 and accompanying text (discussing the federal and state cases on this issue).
153. See supra notes 107-121 (discussing the Coleman decision).
154. Ramona A, 37 Cal. 3d at 809-11, 693 P.2d at 793-95, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 208-10.
155. Id.
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demonstrates that the use of immunities there adopted are essential
to California's privilege against self-incrimination."' 56
The Ramona R. opinion never mentions the fact that the
Coleman court consciously rejected basing the exclusionary rule on
constitutional grounds because of the "infeasibility of propounding
a constitutional rule" and because such a basis would be
"unwise. ' 157 The reasoning of the Coleman court on the point
was fully elaborated,' but goes unmentioned and
unacknowledged in Ramona R. Aside from slighting Coleman as
a precedent, the Ramona R opinion is also deficient in terms of
coming to grips with the constitutional analysis required for
application of the Self Incrimination Clause under either the United
States or California constitutions. At no place in the majority
opinion does the court even attempt to define the "burden" on the
defendant's claim of privilege that would constitute "compulsion"
of any testimony she might give. 159
156. Id. at 809,693 P.2d at 794,210 Cal. Rptr. at 209. The Ramona . opinion speaks in terms
of a "use immunity" operating as a matter of law to protect a defendant who has testified earlier in
a hearing from any use of his or her hearing testimony by the prosecution in a later criminal trial.
Id. The concept of such a use immunity created by operation of law comes from Murphy v.
Waterfront Comm'n of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964). The concept was introduced into
California law in Byers v. Justice Court, 71 Cal. 2d 1039, 1057-58,458 P.2d 465, 477, 80 Cal. Rptr.
853, 865 (1969).
157. Coleman, 13 Cal. 3d at 886, 533 P.2d at 1040, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 400.
158. Id. at 878-89, 533 P.2d at 1034, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 394.
159. See Murphy v. Minnesota, 465 U.S. 420, 429-30 (1984) (discussing the meaning of
'compulsion"). Of the six members of the California Supreme Court participating in the Ramona
R decisions, only Justice Grodin mentions the requirement in his concurrence. Ramona R., 37 Cal.
3d at 811-12, 693 P.2d at 795-96, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 210 (Grodin, J. concurring). He deemed various
aspects of the fitness hearing procedure, particularly the statutory presumption of Ramona R.'s
unfitness for juvenile court treatment, to constitute state compulsion. Id. See supra notes 84-87 and
accompanying text (discussing the contrary position of the United States Supreme Court on the
federal Self Incrimination Clause). It should be noted that there are a number of United States
Supreme Court opinions holding that the fact that a presumption of illegal activity has arisen against
a potential witness does nor mean that the witness is compelled to testify for purposes of the self
incrimination privilege. See, e.g., United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 757-62 (1983), reh'g
denied, 462 U.S. 1112 (1983) (presumption that a person failing to comply with a subpoena is in
contempt of court does not compel, for Self Incrimination Clause purposes, that person to testify at
a civil contempt hearing); Yee Hum v. United States, 268 U.S. 178, 185 (1925) (presumption that
possession of opium is possession of illegally imported opium does not compel, for Self
Incrimination Clause purposes, a defendant to testify to dispel the presumption).
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It is certainly arguable that Ramona R. is virtually a paradigm
of the type of judicial opinion that the voters were trying to combat
by adopting section 28(d). First, the opinion overrules a crucial
aspect of the respected precedent in the field in that the elaborate
analysis in Coleman rejecting a constitutional basis for the
exclusionary rule is completely disregarded. Second, the opinion
goes beyond and is directly contrary to contemporary civil liberties
precedents under the United States Constitution. Third, the opinion
"constitutionalizes" a rule so that the state legislature cannot
reverse, alter, refine or attempt to bring precision to the area
through a statute.
The California Supreme Court has followed the exclusionary
rule adopted in Ramona 1. on one occasion.'60 In People v.
Weaver,"6 1 the court held that the Coleman rule giving the
defendant in a criminal trial the right to exclude testimony he or
she previously gave in a probation revocation hearing survived the
adoption of section 28(d) as a section 940 privilege on the basis of
Ramona ?..162 The majority opinion was written by then
Associate Justice Lucas, who took some pains to indicate
considerable doubt about the Ramona 1. opinion. 63
The only other opinion of the California Supreme Court
addressing the privilege clause in section 28(d) was also written by
Chief Justice Lucas. Between the Weaver opinion in 1985 and
160. A court of appeal has also applied the Ramona R. exclusionary rule to statements given
by a defendant in a treatment program ordered by juvenile court in a dependency hearing. See In re
Jessica B., 207 Cal. App. 3d 504, 518-21, 254 Cal. Rptr. 883, 892-93 (1989).
161. 39 Cal. 3d 654, 703 P.2d 1139, 217 Cal. Rptr. 245 (1985).
162. Id. at 659, 703 P.2d at 1142,217 Cal. Rptr. at 248-49. Appellant Weaver had conceded
that Coleman was "'overruled" by section 28(d) in the petition for hearing he filed with the
California Supreme Court. Appellant's Petition for Hearing filed on June 5, 1984 in California
Supreme Court Crim. No. 23932. The petition was filed seven months before Ramona R. was decided
and indicates the opinion of appellate attorneys specializing in these issues prior to issuance of the
Ramona R. opinion. Appellant Weaver was represented by the California Public Defender.
163. Weaver, 39 Cal. 3d at 659 n.2, 703 P.2d at 1142 n.2, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 249 n.2. Justice
Lucas stated:
I did not participate in Ramona R. and I have several reservations regarding its analysis
and ramifications. But the case did settle the narrow question of whether Coleman's
exclusionary rule reflects a 'statutory' rule of privilege for purposes of Proposition 8, and,
to that extent, I concur in its conclusion.
Id.
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People v. May1" in 1988, the composition of the court had
changed dramatically and the basic attitude of the court toward the
truth in evidence provision was significantly different.165 In May,
a new majority of the court fully accepted a broader purpose for
section 28(d) and used this purpose as a guide in interpreting the
hearsay provision in the privilege clause.1 The May opinion also
reconfirmed the holding in Ramona R.,167 but the manner in
which this was done appears both misconceived and inconsistent
with the major premises of the opinion.
At issue in May was the effect of the truth in evidence section
upon the California rule prohibiting the introduction in evidence of
a defendant's prior out of court statements to impeach the
defendant's testimony at trial if the out of court statements were
obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona.'68 The United States
Supreme Court had squarely held that the Self Incrimination Clause
in the United States Constitution did not prohibit the use of such
statements on the ground that a criminal defendant's privilege to
testify in his own defense "cannot be construed to include the right
to commit perjury." '169 However, the California Supreme Court,
basing its decision on the Self Incrimination Clause in the
164. 44 Cal. 3d 309, 748 P.2d 307, 243 CaL Rptr. 369 (1988).
165. In 1986, Chief Justice Bird and Associate Justices Grodin and Reynoso were denied
reconfirmation in their positions by a majority of California voters in the general election held in
November of that year. Governor Dukemajian, who had been one of the advocates of Proposition 8,
appointed Associate Justice Lucas to be Chief Justice and appointed Associate Justices Arguelles,
Eagleson and Kaufman to the court.
In the last days of the tenure of the court as previously composed, that court issued an opinion
in May which retained the exclusionary rule at issue. That opinion was recalled by the newly
composed court. The reasoning in that opinion, which was written by Justice Mosk, is similar to the
reasoning Justice Mosk used in his dissenting opinion to the ultimate May decision which was issued
almost a year later in February, 1988. See People v. May, 44 Cal. 3d 309, 320-27, 748 P.2d 307,
313-18, 243 Cal. Rptr. 369, 375-80 (1988) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 318-20, 748 P.2d at 312-13, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 374-75.
167. Id. at 317, 748 P.2d at 312, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 374.
168. Id. at 311,748 P.2d at 307,243 Cal. Rptr. at 369. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966) (holding that statements of a suspect held in custody are considered compelled and are
inadmissible to prove the state's case in a criminal prosecution of the suspect unless the suspect has
waived the rights to remain silent and consult with an attorney). In order to ensure that any waiver
by the suspect is valid, the Miranda opinion required police to give the suspect warnings that fully
explain the suspect's rights before the suspect can effectively waive those rights. Id. at 476-79.
169. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971).
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California Constitution, arrived at a different result in People v.
Disbrow,170 holding that statements taken in violation of Miranda
were inadmissible for the purpose of impeaching the defendant in
a criminal prosecution.171
The court of appeal in May held that section 28(d) abrogated
the ruling in Disbrow, and, with substantial additions, the
California Supreme Court adopted the court of appeal opinion. 72
The reasoning of the supreme court addressing the purpose of
section 28(d) was clearly stated in the opinion:
[The "Trth-in-Evidence" provision of our Constitution was probably
intended by the California voters as a means of (1) abrogating judicial
decisions which had required the exclusion of relevant evidence solely
to deter police misconduct in violation of a suspect's constitutional
rights under the state Constitution, while (2) preserving legislatively
created rules of privilege insulating particular communications such as
the attorney-client or physician-patient privilege. As we recently
observed, "'The people have apparently decided that the exclusion of
evidence is not an acceptable means of implementing those rights,
except as required by the Constitution of the United States." 173
In Lance W., the court had recognized the purpose of the truth
in evidence section only in connection with the California search
and seizure evidence restrictions,174 but in May the full scope of
the underlying intent of the section is recognized by the court in a
direct manner. The majority opinion stated:
Thus it seems very likely that Proposition 8 was crafted for the very
purpose, among others, of abrogating cases such as Disbrow, which had
elevated the procedural rights of the criminal defendant above the level
required by the federal constitution, as interpreted by the United States
Supreme Court.
175
170. 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976).
171. Id. at 108-14, 545 P.2d at 276-80, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 364-68 (1976).
172. May, 44 Cal. 3d at 315-18, 748 P.2d at 310-12, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 372-74.
173. Id. at 318, 748 P.2d at 312, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 374 (emphasis in original).
174. See supra notes 55-64 and accompanying text (discussing the Lance W. case).
175. May, 44 Cal. 3d at 318, 748 P.2d at 312, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 374. See Curb, Arguments in
Favor of Proposition 8, in CAL. BALLOT PAhMHLET, supra note 3, at 34.
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The defendant in May had argued that Disbrow had established
a particular application of the privilege against self incrimination
guaranteed by the California Constitution.'76 According to the
defendant's theory, this meant that under the holding in Ramona R.,
Evidence Code section 940 applied to the Disbrow rule to make it
"an existing statutory rule of evidence relating to privilege" and
thereby excepted from the sweep of section 28(d). 17 7 In response,
the May court stressed that Disbrow was explicitly based upon the
Self Incrimination Clause of the California Constitution, and stated:
Defendant disregards the realities underlying the passage of Proposition
8 in discerning some "statutory" privilege which insulates and protects
Disbrow. That case neither concerned nor created any mere statutory
privilege [but was based upon article I, section 15 of the California
Constitution]. We believe that section 28(d) was intended to preclude
this kind of reliance on the state Constitution to create new exclusionary
rules rejected by applicable decisions of the United States Supreme
court. Thus, to accept defendant's thesis would thwart the probable
intent of the framers of, and voters for, Proposition 8.(citations)'78
The May court used the same argument to brush aside a
virtually identical argument based upon the hearsay phrase in the
privilege clause.'7 9 Evidence Code section 1204 states that any
hearsay evidence that is admissible under a hearsay exception shall
nonetheless be considered inadmissible if allowing the hearsay in
evidence would violate either the United States or California
constitutions."' When enacted in 1965, section 1204, like section
176. May, 44 Cal. 3d at 315-15, 748 P.2d at 310-11, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 372-73.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 318-19, 748 P.2d at 312-13, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 374-75 (citations omitted).
179. Id. at 319-20, 748 P.2d at 313, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
180. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1204 (West 1966). Section 1204 provides:
A statement that is otherwise admissible as hearsay evidence is inadmissible against the
defendant in a criminal action if the statement was made, either by the defendant or by
another, under such circumstances that it is inadmissible against the defendant under the
Constitution of the United States or the State of California.
Id.
If the right of criminal defendants to confront witnesses against him or her would be abridged
by the operation of one of the many exceptions to the hearsay rule contained in Evidence Code
sections 1220-1350, the hearsay evidence will nonetheless be inadmissible under the section, This
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940, stated an obvious truism: If admission of evidence against a
criminal defendant would violate either the federal or state
constitutional rights of the defendant, the evidence must not be
admitted."'1 Justice Mosk's dissenting opinion in May argued
strongly that Disbrow had made the use of the hearsay admissions
of a criminal defendant inadmissible under article I, section 15 of
the California Constitution. 182 Under section 1204, the Disbrow
rule was, therefore, a "statutory rule relating to hearsay." ' 3 This
was exactly the same argument that Justice Mosk had adopted in
his majority opinion for the court in Ramona R., essentially
bootstrapping a California constitutional interpretation by the state
supreme court into an "open ended" statutory provision for the
purpose of the privilege clause exception to section 28(d). 114
In Ramona R. a differently composed court had endorsed this
reasoning, but in May the majority brushed it aside, stating:
[Slection 1204 (in much the same manner as section 940) simply
acknowledges the existence of judicial decisions under the state or
federal Constitutions which bear upon the admissibility issue. As we
have previously explained in the context of our analysis of section 940,
in adopting section 28(d) and its exception for "statutory rules of
evidence," the voters probably intended to preserve legislatively created
evidentiary rules, while abrogating judicial decisions which had required
the exclusion of evidence solely on state constitutional grounds. We
would wholly frustrate this intent were we to hold that the Disbrow rule
survived merely because the Legislature had acknowledged the existence
exclusion is also required by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155-64 (1970) (discussing the Confrontation
Clause restrictions on otherwise admissible hearsay evidence).
181. CAL. EviD. CODE § 1204 (West 1966). However, section 940 has other procedural effects
in addition to simple exclusion of evidence. For example, the invocation of the self incrimination
privilege may not be commented upon in the trial of a civil matter because the constitutional privilege
is also made a statutory privilege by section 940, and is thus subject to section 913(a). CAL. EviD.
CODE § 940 (West 1966).
182. May, 44 Cal. 3d at 325-27, 748 P.2d at 317-18, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 379-80 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
183. Id. at 324-25, 748 P.2d at 316-17, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 378-79 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
184. See Ramona P,, 37 Cal. 3d at 808, 693 P.2d at 793, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 208.
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of judicial rules such as Disbrow in statutes such as sections 940 and
1204.185
Having established the proper approach to interpreting both the
general language of section 28(d) and the privilege clause, it is
unfortunate that the court did not overrule Ramona R. In view of
the fact that Chief Justice Lucas had for many years urged the
supreme court to adopt a broader view of the intentions of
California voters in adopting Proposition 8,186 the approval in the
May opinion of Ramona R. is somewhat confusing. The explanation
may well be that then Associate Justice Lucas, with considerable
explicit reservations, accepted Ramona R. as a narrow precedent in
his opinion for the court in Weaver.'87
In the May opinion, Ramona R. is noted twice.'88 In the court
of appeal opinion that was adopted as part of the supreme court's
opinion, Ramona R. is distinguished on the ground that federal
constitutional precedents required the Ramona R. court to hold that
the shifted burden of proof which constituted a "legislatively
compelled self-incriminating statement" involved in the case could
not be used in a subsequent trial."8 9 The original portion of the
supreme court opinion distinguished Ramona R. "on the further
ground that its rule of use immunity was adopted in the face of
conflicting signals from the federal courts regarding the necessity
of such a remedy under the federal constitution." 90 For reasons
discussed above, neither distinction is based upon a correct
premise.19'
185. May, 44 Cal. 3d at 319-20,748 P.2d at 313,243 Cal. Rptr. at 375 (emphasis in original).
186. See People v. Fritz, 40 Cal. 3d 227, 233, 707 P.2d 833, 837, 219 Cal. Rptr. 460, 464
(1985) (Lucas, J., dissenting); People v. Castro, 38 Cal. 3d 301, 322-23, 696 P.2d 111, 124-25, 211
Cal. Rptr. 719, 732 (Lucas, J., dissenting).
187. See supra notes 160-163 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Lucas' treatment of
Ramona R. in Weaver).
188. May, 44 Cal. 3d at 317-18, 748 P.2d at 311-12, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 373-74.
189. Id. at 317, 748 P.2d at 311, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 373.
190. Id. at 318, 748 P.2d at 312,243 Cal. Rptr. at 374 (citing Ramona R, 37 Cal. 3d 802, 693
P.2d 789, 210 Cal. Rptr. 204 (1985)).
191. Contrary to the court of appeal's stated premise, the United States Supreme Court held,
prior to Ramona R., that the only forms of "'compulsion" that implicate the federal self-incrimination
clause are custodial interrogations and direct criminal penalties imposed by the state for refusal to
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The supreme court's discussion of Ramona 1. in May is
unnecessary for the holding of the latter opinion that statements of
the defendant taken in violation of Miranda may be used to
impeach the defendant in a criminal prosecution.192 The
discussion of Ramona R. is also unnecessary for the rationale
adopted by the court in May to reach its holding that judicial
decisions requiring exclusion of evidence solely on the basis of a
provision in the California Constitution were abrogated by section
28(d).'93 The distinctions regarding Ramona R. are therefore
dicta, and subject to future challenge. This is fortunate, because
neither distinction is sound. 194
As to the two cases in which courts have relied upon Ramona
R., under either of the grounds for distinguishing that opinion from
the rationale adopted in May, both are incorrectly decided. In
give statements or testimony. See supra notes 136-138 and accompanying text (discussing the
compulsion requirement in the Self Incrimination Clause). The court of appeal apparently believed
that the existence of a statutory rebuttable presumption against the Ramona R. defendant "compelled"
her to testify for purposes of federal Constitutional law. See May, 44 Cal. 3d at 317, 748 P.2d at 311,
243 Cal. Rptr. at 373. This was a clear misreading of the law. The United States Supreme Court has
long held that a statutorily mandated shift in the burden of proof against a party refusing to explain
or deny a presumed fact is not compulsion for purposes of the Self Incrimination Clause. See supra
note 159 and accompanying text.
The California Supreme Court adopted the false premise that federal courts had not resolved
the question of the application of the federal self-incrimination clause to concurrent proceedings at
the time Ramona R. was decided. Ramona R., 37 Cal. 3d at 808, 693 P.2d at 793, 210 Cal. Rptr. at
208. The United States Suprdme Court's opinion in Murphy had clearly established that the federal
privilege against self-incrimination did not apply to prior testimony in concurrent hearings. See supra
notes 128-138 and accompanying text (discussing the Murphy decision). The California Supreme
Court opinion in Ramona R neglected to mention the controlling Murphy opinion and the numerous
lower federal and state court opinions holding in accord with Murphy. See supra notes 150-152 and
accompanying text (discussing the Ramona R. opinion's failure to mention the Murphy opinion) and
note 152 (citing federal and state court opinions in accord with Murphy).
The contentions that Ramona R merely followed federal law or was decided while federal law
was uncertain were unconvincing to at least one member of the California Supreme Court in May.
Justice Eagleson concurred in the judgment of the majority, but expressed his view that Ramona R.
"clearly created" a new remedial exclusionary rule. May, 44 Cal. 3d at 320, 748 P.2d at 313, 243
Cal. Rptr. at 375 (Eagleson, J., concurring).
192. May, 44 Cal. 3d at 319, 748 P.2d at 313, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
193. Id. at 318, 748 P.2d at 312, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 374. In dissent, Justice Mosk stated: "'ifn
support of their conclusion..., the majority reason in substance that the intent of those who drafted
and voted for section 28(d) was to abrogate judicial decisions requiring the exclusion of evidence
solely on state constitutional grounds .... - Id. at 325,748 P.2d at 317,243 Cal. Rptr. at 378 (Mosk,
J., dissenting).
194. See supra note 191.
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Weaver, the procedure of the parole revocation proceeding involved
did not include a shift of the burden of proof requiring the state to
prove its case. There was also no confusion over the United States
Supreme Court's position on concurrent proceeding probation
hearing testimony at a later criminal trial after Minnesota v.
Murphy.9 5 The same is true of Jessica B., 96 there being no
reversal of the burden of proof in a dependency hearing and,
following Murphy, no conflict on the proposition that the federal
Self Incrimination Clause privilege did not apply in the concurrent
proceedings situation at issue.
Regardless of the fact that Ramona R. appears to have been
undercut by the state supreme court's opinion in May, the opinion
still stands as an ostensibly valid precedent and lower courts will
have to deal with both Ramona R. and the two cases that have
followed it. Ramona . should be overruled for the reasons clearly
indicated in May. It is an opinion that created a new privilege
under the California Constitution and an exclusionary rule to
implement that privilege three years after the electorate of the state
had adopted a state constitutional provision intended to eliminate
past judicially created exclusionary rules and prohibit future
judicially created exclusionary rules.
A coherent basis for overruling Ramona R is available, and it
proceeds from the realization found in the portion of the court of
appeal opinion adopted by the supreme court in May.'97 Ramona
R. extended the self incrimination privilege uhder the California
Constitution rather than merely adding an exclusionary rule to the
remedies that could be invoked to protect an existing privilege. 198
The Ramona R. opinion thereby created a new right possessed by
defendants in concurrent proceedings to give testimony (that the
Ramona R. opinion considered to be compelled by virtue of a
shifted burden of proof) in a hearing without running the risk that
the testimony might be used against the defendant in a subsequent
195. See supra notes 128-138 and accompanying text (discussing the Murphy decision).
196. See supra note 160 (discussing the Jessica B. decision).
197. See May, 44 Cal. 3d at 317-18, 748 P.2d at 312, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 374 (discussing the
scope of the privilege against self-incrimination as determined in the Ramona R. opinion).
198. Id.
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criminal prosecution. The court used the term "use immunity" as
a shorthand for this right, with the idea being that if the defendant
chooses to be a witness and testify at the hearing, his or her
testimony will be treated as if the state had conferred use immunity
upon the defendant witness.
This creation of a new privilege under article I, section 15 of
the California Constitution did not occur until the Ramona R.
decision was handed down in 1985. Prior to that, the right had been
considered an exclusionary rule and was nonconstitutional in nature
under the express holding of Coleman. For this reason, the
privilege created by Ramona R. was not "existing" on June 8,
1982, the date on which section 28(d) became effective. The
privilege clause exception excludes from the operation of the truth
in evidence section "any existing statutory rule of evidence relating
to privilege."' 99 The exception should apply only to privileges in
existence, meaning those enacted by the state legislature or,
accepting the premise of Ramona R., by judicial interpretation of
article I, section 15 of the California Constitution, rendered in an
opinion issued before June 8, 1988.2" The privilege to exclude
prior hearing testimony created by the Ramona R. opinion, issued
January 28, 1985, was neither.
It is an accepted maxim in constitutional interpretation that in
interpreting any amendment to the document, meaning should be
given to every word in the amendment.2"' The term "existing,"
as used in the privileges clause, can only refer to a privilege that
was in existence on the date that section 28(d) became effective.
This would obviously prevent the state legislature from creating a
new privilege excluding evidence after the effective date, unless
199. CAL CONST. art. 1, § 28(d).
200. Of course it is highly questionable whether the California constitutional privilege created
by Ramona 1. should logically be considered a statutory privilege, even under the open ended
language of Evidence Code section 940. If the question were one of fust impression for the same
California Supreme Court that decided May, the answer is clear that the Ramona R. privilege would
not be considered -statutory.- However, the Ramona R. court had a different composition and
decided that the privilege it created in that case was -statutory.- Ramona R. v. Superior Court, 37
Cal. 3d 802, 804, 693 P.2d 789, 790, 210 Cal. Rptr. 204, 205 (1985).
201. In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d 873,902-03,694 P.2d 744,763-64,210 Cal. Rptr. 631,650-51
(1985) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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each of the two houses of the legislature approved the new
privilege by greater than a two thirds vote. By the same token, the
word "existing" should prevent a court from creating a new
privilege after the effective date of section 28(d). This should be
the case regardless of the basis on which the court claims to be
creating the privilege, including the claim that the new privilege is
created by an interpretation of article I, section 15 of the state
constitution which arguably becomes a statutory privilege under
Evidence Code section 940. Of course any privileges created by
court interpretation of article I, section 15 of the California
Constitution prior to the effective date of section 28(d) will still be
valid.2"
This common sense reading of section 28(d) not only would
give effect to a crucial word in the truth in evidence section, but
would also harmonize both section 15 and section 28(d) of the
California Constitution. The previous omission of the courts to
consider this point is attributable to the fact that the argument was
not made to the supreme court in Ramona R 203 At the first
opportunity, a court presented with a concurrent proceeding
question should address the omission and overrule Ramona R.
IV. CONCLUSION
With the exception of the 1985 opinion in Ramona R., which
requires attention in the manner indicated above, California courts
202. In People v. Jacobs, 158 Cal. App. 3d 740, 745-51, 204 Cal. Rptr. 849, 852-57 (1984),
a court of appeal held that a California court interpretation of section 15 excluding evidence of
silence upon arrest was not abrogated by the adoption of section 28(d) because of the effect of
Evidence Code section 940 and the privileges clause. Id. At issue in the case was whether the self
incrimination privilege prevented a prosecutor from mentioning the defendant's post arrest silence
during cross examination of the defendant at trial. Id. While the federal courts had held that the
practice did not violate the Fifth Amendment privilege, the California Supreme Court had not decided
the issue.
After reviewing a number of California appellate opinions issued before adoption of section
28(d), the Jacobs court held that past precedent supported an interpretation of the California
constitutional Self Incrimination Clause prohibiting the practice. Id. at 749-50,204 Cal. Rptr. at 856.
The Jacobs opinion demonstrates a logical method to give effect to both the privilege clause and the
intent of the drafters of section 28(d) to make the "open ended" section 940 available for privileges
developed by court interpretation prior to the effective date of section 28(d).
203. See briefs in Ramona R. on file in Hastings Law Library.
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have been both pragmatic and observant of the electorate's intent
in applying the terms of the privileges clause in the truth in
evidence section. After the California Supreme Court's opinion four
years ago in May, lower courts have a conclusive statement of
guiding principle to employ in the future. At present, the most
important required application of that principle would be to
overrule of the Ramona R. decision.
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